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We study how the structure of housing finance affects the transmission of monetary 
policy shocks. We document three main facts: first, the features of residential 
mortgage markets differ markedly across industrialized countries; second, and ac- 
cording to a wide range of indicators, the transmission of monetary policy shocks to 
residential investment and house prices is significantly stronger in those countries 
with larger flexibility/development of mortgage markets; third, the transmission to 
consumption is stronger only in those countries where mortgage equity release is 
common and mortgage contracts are predominantly of the variable-rate type. We 
build a two-sector DSGE model with price stickiness and collateral constraints and 
analyze how the response of consumption and residential investment to monetary 
policy shocks is affected by alternative values of two institutional features: (i) down-
payment rate; (ii) interest rate mortgage structure (variable vs. fixed rate). In line with 
our empirical evidence, the sensitivity of both variables to monetary policy shocks 
increases with lower values of the down-payment rate and is larger under a variable- 
rate mortgage structure. 
 
Keywords: Housing finance, mortgage markets, collateral constraint, monetary 
policy. 
 
JEL Classification: E21, E44, E52. 
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We study the relationship between the structure of housing finance and the monetary 
transmission mechanism in several industrialized countries. We show that there is 
significant heterogeneity in the institutional characteristics of national mortgage 
markets across the main industrialized countries, and especially within the EU. 
Examples of such institutional characteristics include the typical duration of mortgage 
contracts, the required levels of down-payment (or inverse loan-to-value ratios), the 
existence (or lack thereof) of equity release products. 
In addition to the aforementioned indicators we also classify countries according to 
the prevailing interest-rate structure of mortgage contracts, namely flexible vs. fixed 
interest rate contracts. 
We then conduct a VAR-based analysis of the effects of monetary policy shocks on 
consumption, house prices and residential investment in a sample of industrialised 
countries. We classify the countries into two groups, according to their degree of 
development of mortgage markets and according to their prevailing interest rate 
structure of mortgage contracts (fixed vs. variable rate). 
The empirical analysis leads to two main results: 
•  First, the size of the peak effect of a monetary policy shock on residential 
investment is positively and significantly related both to our indicators of 
flexibility in mortgage markets (with higher flexibility translating into larger 
sensitivity) and to the type of interest rate structure (with residential 
investment being significantly more responsive to policy innovations in those 
countries with a variable rate mortgage structure). A similar pattern emerges 
for the response of house prices.  
•  Second, we find that the evidence for consumption is mixed. Namely, 
consumption is significantly more responsive only in those countries where 
mortgage equity release is common and, especially, where prevailing 
mortgage contracts are of the variable rate type. Other indicators of mortgage 
markets flexibility, such as the LTV ratio or the ratio of mortgage debt-to-
GDP, turn out not to be relevant for the  response of consumption across 
countries to monetary innovations. 6
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In order to rationalise these findings, as in Iacoviello (2005) and Campbell and 
Hercowitz (2004) we build a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model where 
there are two groups of households, borrowers and savers, and two sectors, producing 
(non-durable) consumption goods and new housing respectively. The two types of 
households feature heterogeneous preferences, with the borrowers being more 
impatient than the savers, implying that their marginal utility of consumption exceeds 
the marginal utility of saving. Borrowers are subject to a collateral constraint, with the 
borrowing limit tied to the value of the existing stock of housing. 
In the model analysis we show that the response of consumption and residential 
investment to monetary policy shocks is affected by alternative values of two 
institutional parameters of mortgage markets: the down-payment rate, and the interest-
rate mortgage structure (variable vs. fixed interest rate). In particular, the model can 
rationalize the evidence that private consumption is more responsive to monetary 
impulses in economies with more developed/flexible mortgage markets, somewhat in 
contrast with the presumption that more developed mortgage (credit) markets should 
be conducive to more efficient consumption-smoothing. 
 7
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1 Introduction
The role of housing wealth on economic activity has recently attracted considerable atten-
tion among academic researchers, policy-makers and press commentators.1 This attention
is partly explained by the sizeable rises in property prices and household indebtedness in
several industrialized countries over the recent years (Debelle 2004, Terrones and Otrok
2004), and the need to understand both the determinants of such rises and their poten-
tial implications for monetary policy and ￿nancial stability. The recent global ￿nancial
turmoil allegedly originating from the residential property market in the US has strength-
ened the interest in these matters even further. Beyond the policy considerations, there
is a growing interest in assessing the e⁄ects of changes in property prices on consumption
decisions, given the predominance of housing in total household wealth (Campbell and
Cocco 2003, Muellbauer and Murphy 2008).
This paper studies the relationship between the structure of housing ￿nance and the
monetary transmission mechanism in several industrialized countries. We ￿rst show that
there is signi￿cant heterogeneity in the institutional characteristics of national mortgage
markets across the main industrialized countries, and especially within the EU. Examples
of such institutional characteristics include the typical duration of mortgage contracts, the
required levels of down-payment (or inverse loan-to-value ratios), the existence (or lack
thereof) of equity release products. We interpret these indicators as alternative measures
of the degree of development/￿ exibility of mortgage markets. There is in fact one channel,
working from housing ￿nance to the macroeconomy, that we aim at capturing by means
of these indicators: the extent to which mortgage contracts allow to translate the value
of housing as a collateral into current availability of credit for households. In turn, this
credit can be used not only to ￿nance new housing expenditure but also (non-housing)
consumption.2
In addition to the aforementioned indicators we also classify countries according to the
prevailing interest-rate structure of mortgage contracts, namely ￿ exible vs. ￿xed interest
rate contracts. We treat this indicator separately for it does not necessarily re￿ ect a higher
1For recent academic contributions see Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe (2004), Davies and Heathcote
(2005), Iacoviello (2005) and the literature review by Leung (2004); for contributions from a policy
perspective see ECB (2003), Catte et al. (2004), Girouard and Bl￿ndal (2001), BIS (2004) and IMF
(2005, 2008); for a press account see The Economist (2003).
2See, for instance, Aron and Muellbauer (2006).8
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or lower degree of development of mortgage markets.3 We believe this channel may be
particularly important for the transmission of monetary policy, especially on consumption,
for it represents a direct channel through which monetary policy, by altering the service
cost of debt, can a⁄ect current disposable income.
We then conduct a VAR-based analysis of the e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks on
consumption, house prices and residential investment in a sample of industrialised coun-
tries. We classify the countries into two groups, according to their degree of development
of mortgage markets. Those belonging to the ￿rst (second) group are countries where
LTV ratios are low, mortgage equity release is common (absent or partial) and the ratio
of mortgage debt-to-GDP is high (low). We then also classify countries according to their
prevailing interest rate structure of mortgage contracts (￿xed vs. variable rate).
We ￿nd two main results. First, the size of the peak e⁄ect of a monetary policy shock
on residential investment is positively and signi￿cantly related both to our indicators of
￿ exibility in mortgage markets (with higher ￿ exibility translating into larger sensitivity)
and to the type of interest rate structure (with residential investment being signi￿cantly
more responsive to policy innovations in those countries with a variable rate mortgage
structure). A similar pattern emerges for the response of house prices. Second, we ￿nd
that the evidence for consumption is mixed. Namely, consumption is signi￿cantly more
responsive only in those countries where mortgage equity release is common and, espe-
cially, where prevailing mortgage contracts are of the variable rate type. Other indicators
of mortgage markets ￿ exibility, such as the LTV ratio or the ratio of mortgage debt-
to-GDP, turn out not to be relevant for the di⁄erential response of consumption across
countries to monetary innovations.
Under frictionless ￿nancial markets, the structure of housing ￿nance should in princi-
ple be immaterial for the e⁄ects of monetary shocks. To rationalize our evidence we build
a model that extends the baseline monetary policy framework in three main directions.4
First, it allows for two sectors, respectively producing consumption goods and new hous-
ing. Second, it features heterogeneity of preferences between impatient consumers and
patient consumers (in equilibrium, borrowers and savers respectively). The former do not
3It remains true, though, that in several countries the introduction of variable rate mortgage contracts
has paralleled the process of deregulation in mortgage markets.
4Such baseline framework, featuring perfect ￿nancial markets, is usually labelled as New Keynesian
(see Clarida et al. 1999, Woodford 2003).9
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act as standard permanent-income agents, but exhibit preferences tilted towards current
consumption. The borrowers may be thought of as that share of the population for which
acquiring a loan/mortgage requires providing an asset, and housing in particular, as a
form of collateral. Third, private borrowing is constrained by the value of the collateral.
That value is endogenously tied to the evolution of the price of housing.
Thus, in a context where mortgage markets allow more easily to convert asset values
into borrowing, and therefore spending, consumption and residential investment should be
more responsive to underlying shocks. In our framework, the relevant institutional features
of the mortgage market are summarized by two main parameters: (i) the down-payment
rate, and (ii) the interest-rate structure of the contract. We calibrate and simulate the
model based on our introductory evidence on the heterogenous characteristics of mortgage
markets in industrialized countries. We ￿nd that both institutional features magnify the
responses of consumption and residential investment to monetary policy shocks.
General equilibrium borrower-saver models build on the earlier analysis of Kiyotaki and
Moore (KM) (1997) and Krusell and Smith (1998). Recently, Iacoviello (2005) extends
the KM framework to include features more typical of the New Keynesian monetary
policy literature, whereas Campbell and Hercowitz (2004) extend this category of models
to a real business cycle framework and explore the role of credit market innovations in
contributing to the so-called Great Moderation. The modelling section of our work is
related to the last two papers, but it di⁄ers in two main ingredients: ￿rst, it features a
two-sector structure (so that residential investment is an endogenous variable); second,
it models institutional characteristics of the mortgage market (such as variable vs. ￿xed
rate contracts) and analyzes how they shape the transmission of monetary policy shocks.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we document some key institutional
di⁄erences in mortgage markets across industrialized countries. We conduct some VAR-
based empirical analysis in Section 3, focussing on the impact of a monetary policy shock
on housing market-related variables. The structural model is developed in Section 4 and
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 presents some dynamic simulations. Section 7 concludes.10
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2 Housing ￿nance in the industrialized countries
In this section we document that mortgage markets di⁄er signi￿cantly across industri-
alized countries in terms of both size and key institutional characteristics, such as the
prevailing contractual arrangements and the available product range. This heterogeneity
is particularly evident within the euro area, where mortgage lending remains a predomi-
nantly domestic business activity, largely re￿ ecting national traditions and cultural factors
as well as the institutional settings of the local banking sector.
Table 1 summarizes some of the institutional indicators that have been identi￿ed in
the literature as most likely to have a bearing on the relationship between housing wealth
and consumption, as well as on the channels of monetary policy transmission (see, e.g.,
MacLennan et al. 1998 and Debelle 2004). We report data for a total of nineteen countries,
including nine euro area countries, some European countries outside the euro area, Japan
and the main Anglo-Saxon countries.
The indicators included in Table 1 are: (i) mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio; (ii) typical
LTV ratio; (iii) type of interest-rate structure; (iv) typical mortgage contract duration,
(v) di⁄usion of home equity release products, and (vi) the IMF (2008) index of mortgage
market development and completeness.
Cross-country heterogeneity is pervasive in all indicators considered. Mortgage-to-
GDP ratios vary widely across countries: values range between 13% in Italy and 116%
in Switzerland. Among the large countries, Italy and France have the lowest ratios,
while the ratios in the UK and the US are relatively high. Also typical LTV ratios vary
signi￿cantly across countries, ranging between 50% in Italy and 90% in the Netherlands
and UK.5 Cross-country variations in these ratios partly re￿ ect di⁄erences in legal and
regulatory frameworks.6 Hence, they re￿ ect - at least to some extent - institutional factors
which are largely exogenous.
The heterogeneity in terms of interest rate adjustment is also substantial across coun-
5Data from the Council of Mortgage Lenders show that during the past housing boom LTV ratios
above 90% were fairly common in the UK.
6For instance, it has been argued (e.g., MacLennan et al. 1998, and Ahearne et al. 2005) that the
reason why the LTV ratio has been historically low in Italy lies in the di¢ culty for the lender to enforce
repossession in case of default of the borrower, given the country￿ s slow and costly judicial proceedings.
In Japan, the mortgage market has been historically dominated by a public agency that kept LTV ratios
low and focused on ￿nancing purchases of new rather than used housing (Seko 1994).11
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tries. Conceptually, mortgage contracts can be distinguished between variable and ￿xed
rate mortgages: variable rate contracts are those in which the lending rate ￿ oats with,
or is frequently adjusted to, a short-term market interest rate; ￿xed rate contracts are
those in which the lending rate remains constant throughout the duration of the contract.
In practice, contracts do not always fully conform to these conceptual types and often
fall under intermediate categories (Borio 1996). Among the EU countries, the UK, Spain
and Italy mainly have variable or adjustable rate mortgages, although for the latter two
countries this re￿ ects a relatively recent development.7 By contrast, Germany, France,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands are mainly characterized by ￿xed rate
mortgages, similar to the US and Canada.
An additional element of divergence among national mortgage markets is the extent
of the recourse to home equity release. Following changes in house prices and mortgage
interest rates, collateral constrained agents may wish to adjust their net borrowing po-
sitions or to re￿nance the terms of their existing mortgages according to the changed
conditions. For instance, in light of a run-up in house prices (and especially if that run-up
is expected to continue into the future), borrowers may increase the amount of their mort-
gage loans or apply for a second mortgage against the increased value of their collateral.
The released mortgage equity may be subsequently used for a variety of purposes, such
as debt re￿nancing, acquisition of durable goods, purchase of ￿nancial assets or home im-
provements. When mortgage interest rates decrease, agents may be willing to re-￿nance
their mortgages to take advantage of lower interest payments in order to free liquidity for
other expenditures or, alternatively, they may want to increase their borrowing to re￿ ect
their increased debt servicing capacity. Alternatively, and mostly in countries with highly
￿ exible and developed mortgage markets, lenders may be more willing to extend so-called
home equity lines of credit (or, broadly speaking, home equity loans) when they observe
an increase in house prices. Conversely, during a downturn in house prices, as in the re-
cent ￿nancial turmoil, such equity lines of credit are often the ￿rst ones to be scaled back
by lenders. At the same time, in those instances, lenders may ￿nd it convenient to walk
away from delinquent home equity loans rather than pushing borrowers into foreclosure on
the primary mortgage.8 All these margins are likely to have signi￿cant consequences on
7Japan also has mainly variable rate mortgages.
8See, for instance, Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2008.12
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current disposable income, and therefore on current consumption for liquidity constrained
individuals.
Overall, the use of home equity release remains limited in some countries as reported in
Table 1, though mortgage equity extraction and re￿nancing have become signi￿cant at the
aggregate level in a few of them (e.g., US, UK and the Netherlands). In some cases, the
limited recourse to home equity release may re￿ ect scarce availability of suitable mortgage
contracts (e.g., due to regulatory constraints). However, in most countries borrowers
are deterred from re￿nancing their contracts by administrative obstacles and prohibitive
transaction costs.9 In such countries, mortgage lending is likely to interact with interest
rate and house price developments only to a very limited extent (namely only for the new
mortgage contracts and not for the existing ones, which mostly re￿ ect market conditions
prevailing at the time they were signed rather than current conditions). The US has
been historically one of the main exceptions to this pattern, with the special nature of its
national mortgage market becoming particularly evident in recent years as US borrowers
have taken advantage of low interest rates, rising house prices and a dramatic decline
in transaction costs to engage in a wave of mortgage re￿nancing and equity extraction
commonly thought to have been large enough to in￿ uence aggregate spending.
IMF (2008) compiles a synthetic indicator of the degree of development and complete-
ness of national mortgage markets. In particular, the value of the index for each country
is a function of various indicators, such as LTV ratios, the ability to extract mortgage
equity or to re￿nance without incurring fees, the development of secondary markets for
mortgage loans, etc. Higher values of the index (which lies between 0 and 1) indicate
a more developed and advanced national mortgage market. With the exception of the
Netherlands, European countries tend to have relatively low values. In particular, the
three largest euro area economies (Germany, France and Italy) are those with the lowest
values in the sample. Similarly, the value of the index is low for Japan. By contrast, the
index assigns relatively high values to the Anglo-Saxon economies, with the US scoring
almost the maximum level.
9For instance, Borio (1996) documents the penalties and administrative costs that borrowers willing
to repay in advance their medium- and long-term (not necessarily mortgage) loans face in a number of
countries.13
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3 Housing ￿nance and monetary policy transmission:
the evidence
Institutional di⁄erences across mortgage markets are often cited as a likely source of
cross-country di⁄erences in the speed and strength of the transmission of monetary policy
impulses to the economy. The size and distribution of household mortgage debt, average
maturity of contracts and type of interest rate adjustment are usually listed among the
characteristics likely to determine the extent of the income and collateral e⁄ects induced
by changes in interest rates (Debelle 2004).
BIS (1995) concludes that monetary policy could be expected to have comparatively
stronger e⁄ects in Anglo-Saxon countries than in continental Europe (with the possible
exception of Italy, where variable rate mortgages predominate). Borio (1996) notes that
this split coincides with that between countries with more or less developed ￿nancial
structures, though this does not amount to conclusive evidence. Iacoviello (2002) relates
variations in the magnitude of output responses to monetary policy shocks across Euro-
pean countries to di⁄erences in ￿nancial systems. Likewise, Angeloni et al. (2003) refer
to institutional di⁄erences in housing ￿nance as one possible explanation for the more
muted response of private consumption to monetary policy shocks in the euro area com-
pared with the US. In recent years, the remarkable heterogeneity in private consumption
developments between some continental European countries and most Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries at a time of (common) worldwide low interest rates has seemed to provide further
con￿rmation about the importance of structural di⁄erences in mortgage markets across
countries in determining the strength of the housing channel.
In this section we estimate a baseline VAR model for 19 advanced countries, includ-
ing Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States. The data are quarterly and cover the 1970:1 to 2008:2
sample period. For a great majority of the time series the source is the OECD Economic14
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for each country i and time t. The vector of the endogenous variables, Y i
t , includes (in
this order) private consumption, residential investment, the consumer price index (CPI),
the real house price, a 3-month interbank interest rate, and the real e⁄ective exchange
rate. We include the real e⁄ective exchange rate to cater for open economy in￿ uences
that, while arguably secondary for the US economy, are likely to matter considerably for
the small open economies in our group of countries. The identi￿cation of monetary policy
shocks in the VAR is achieved by assuming that the Ai
0 matrix has a Choleski structure
in each country.11
The model in (1) is estimated on quarterly data, seasonally adjusted whenever appro-
priate, on a sample period between 1980:1 and 2007:4. For two countries, the starting
date is later due to data availability (1981 for Switzerland, 1988 for Austria).12 The VAR
models are speci￿ed in levels and, with the exception of the interest rates, all variables
are in expressed in logs. Based on the Schwartz information criterion, a lag order of two
(in levels) is found to be optimal for this model across all countries.13
After estimating the VAR model for each country, we run the pooling test (based on
10We have used alternative sources whenever the OECD database was not su¢ cient. For private con-
sumption data for Austria are from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) database, and the data
for Germany have been compiled by splicing data from the OEO and the BIS. For residential investment,
again data for Austria come from the BIS and for Germany partly from the BIS and partly from the OEO.
Moreover, data for Spain are from Eurostat and for Switzerland from the BIS. For the e⁄ective exchange
rate, all data come from the OEO except Denmark (BIS) and Ireland (IMF International Financial Sta-
tistics and OEO). Data for the CPI for the United Kingdom are from the BIS, and for Germany both
from the BIS and the OEO. The main source for house prices is the ECB Residential Property Prices
(RPP) database. For a number of countries we had to use alternative, mainly national, sources where
the RPP data were not su¢ cient. For Japan, in particular, we used the BIS data and for the United
Kingdom we spliced RPP and BIS data.
11See, for instance, Christiano et al. (1999). Our results are not sensitive to alternative orderings of the
variables: for instance, whether consumption is ordered before or after residential investment (although
it may seem plausible that residential investment reacts more quickly to monetary impulses than real
consumption), or the real exchange rate ordered before or after the short-term nominal interest rate.
12Notice that, due to data limitations, we have not included another possibly relevant variable in the
VARs, i.e., mortgage debt. Also, the lack of harmonized data on house prices has to be emphasized; even
within the euro area house price data are not fully comparable. For this reason, the results on house
prices have to be interpreted with relatively more caution.
13Giuliodori (2004) conducts a similar analysis for several EU countries, ￿nding similar results to this
study.15
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a Wald test of equal coe¢ cients) to check whether a panel speci￿cation with pooled cross
sections could be preferable. However, we ￿nd that the data overwhelmingly reject the
null that the coe¢ cients in model (1) are the same across countries.14 Therefore, rather
than estimating a pooled panel which would in this case likely lead to biased estimates, we
estimate the model country-by-country and then consider the average impulse response
of the endogenous variables to a standardised contractionary monetary policy shock (i.e.,
a shock of the same magnitude to the equation for the 3-month interest rate).
In order to obtain the standard errors around the average impulse response to a mon-
etary policy shock, we resort to a bootstrapping procedure.15 That procedure works as
follows. We ￿rst estimate the models in (1) and save the model residuals, stacking them in
a single data group in order to allow for possible cross-country correlations in residuals to
be taken into account. We then repeat the procedure by adding the re-sampled residuals
to the endogenous variables, re-estimate the VAR models, compute the average impulse
responses, and store them. After repeating the procedure 1,000 times, we obtain a distri-
bution of average impulse responses, based on which we compute average and standard
error across bootstraps.
Figure 1 reports the group average impulse responses of private consumption, resi-
dential investment and the real house price to a monetary policy shock. The impulse
responses generally accord well with the conventional wisdom on the e⁄ects of a mone-
tary policy shock. Both private consumption and residential investment fall temporarily
after the shock in the usual hump-shaped manner, and ultimately go back to the baseline.
The e⁄ect on residential investment is, on average, quicker and much larger at the peak
than the e⁄ect on private consumption, a result which has been already emphasised in
the literature, especially on US data (see, e.g., Erceg and Levin 2006). In addition, real
house prices fall in response to the shock, with this response also displaying an inertial
behavior.
We then turn to the key objective of this analysis, namely establishing whether the
transmission of monetary policy shocks is di⁄erent across countries according to the degree
of development in their mortgage markets. In order to shed some light on this question we
14For the sake of brevity we do not report the results of the tests, but those results are available upon
request from the corresponding author.
15Since the VAR residuals appear to be non normal in many countries, we choose a bootstrap rather
than a Monte Carlo procedure.16
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divide the full group of 19 countries in two sub-groups according to several indicators of
mortgage market development. First, we rank the countries according to their mortgage
debt-to-GDP ratio and to the typical LTV ratio. In this way, we classify countries below
the median country in the ranking as "low development" countries, and the remaining
ones as "high development". As to the ability of engaging in mortgage re￿nancing and
mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW), we divide the countries between those where this
is possible (high development) and those where this is not possible (low development).
Finally, we classify countries according to whether their mortgage debt structure is pre-
dominantly ￿xed rate or variable rate. Table 2 reports the chosen classi￿cation for all
countries in our group. We choose to report results for a classi￿cation based on all the
alternative indicators for this should arguably increase the robustness of our results.
Based on the above classi￿cation, we then study whether the transmission of a mon-
etary policy shock is signi￿cantly di⁄erent across sub-groups. We therefore compute the
average impulse response to a standardised monetary policy in each sub-group. The
results are reported in Figure 2 for private consumption, Figure 3 for residential invest-
ment, and Figure 4 for the real house price (standard errors are again computed based on
the bootstrapping procedure described above). In each ￿gure, the thick blue line refers
to countries with either highly developed mortgage markets or variable rate mortgages,
whereas the thin purple line to countries with either less developed markets or ￿xed rate
mortgages. The general message is that there appears to be a strong di⁄erence between the
two sub-groups as regards the response of the housing market-related variables, namely
residential investment and the real house price: monetary policy exerts more powerful
e⁄ects on housing markets in countries where the underlying mortgage market is more
developed (according to our metric), and mortgages are mostly of the variable rate type.
As regards consumption, the results are more mixed. On the one hand, countries where
MEW is practiced and where the interest rate adjustment is predominantly of the variable
rate type continue to show a signi￿cantly stronger impact of monetary policy shocks on
consumption. On the other hand, the results for the loan to value ratio index and for the
mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio do not show any signi￿cant di⁄erential e⁄ect.16
16We conducted a series of sensitivity experiments, that, for the sake of brevity, we refrain from
reporting here. Results were shown to be qualitatively robust to: (i) the exclusion of a time trend; (ii)
dropping the time trend and adding the real price of oil as exogenous variable; (iii) computing generalized
impulse responses; (iv) exclusion of time trend plus three autoregressive lags; (v) starting sample period17
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In order to formally test for the statistical signi￿cance of the di⁄erences in the mean
impulse responses across the sub-groups, Table 3 reports such di⁄erences for consumption,
residential investment and the real house price at 4, 8, 12 and 24 quarters ahead, together
with a formal test of statistical signi￿cance, again derived using a bootstrapping proce-
dure. To clarify, let dX(k) be the absolute value of the average estimated impulse response
of variable X at horizon k. Then each entry in Table 3 reports dX(k)low ￿ dX(k)high or
dX(k)fix ￿ dX(k)var, where, respectively, "low" and "high" stands for highly and lowly
developed mortgage markets (with the degree of development measured across di⁄erent
indicators), and "￿x" and "var" for ￿xed rate and variable rate contracts respectively.
As can be seen in the Table, most of the di⁄erences between sub-group mean responses
are negatively signed and often statistically signi￿cant, which - given the ordering of the
two sub-groups - shows that on the whole monetary policy is relatively more powerful in
countries with more developed mortgage markets and variable rate mortgages.
Two observations are relevant at this stage. First, a more structural investigation
of the link between mortgage markets characteristics and the transmission of monetary
policy shocks requires a theoretical framework. Second, the fact that private spending is
more responsive to monetary impulses in economies with more developed credit/mortgage
markets, at least according to some indicators, may be perceived as a puzzle. In principle,
in a standard representative-agent model of the monetary transmission with free borrowing
and lending, the structure of credit/mortgage markets should be immaterial for the e⁄ects
of policy. In addition, a priori, one may believe that more developed ￿nancial markets
would allow households to smooth consumption more e¢ ciently, whereas our results point
to a larger variability of consumption, at least conditional on monetary policy shocks.
In the following, we present a model in which a fraction of agents, in equilibrium,
do not choose to behave as permanent-income consumers. Rather, for these agents, it
is optimal to increase their borrowing in light of any given rise in income. Their access
to credit is constrained by an endogenously determined limit. Thus, in a context where
credit markets allow to convert asset values (e.g., housing) into borrowing and therefore
consumption more easily, consumption itself should be in principle more responsive to
underlying shocks. We describe our model in the next section.
in the mid 1980s; (vi) Spain classi￿ed as ￿xed-rate; (vii) exclusion of time trend and real exchange rate.18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1069
July 2009
4 The model
The economy is composed of a continuum of households in the interval (0;1). As in Ia-
coviello (2005) and Campbell and Hercowitz (2004), there are two groups of households,
named borrowers and savers, that we assume of measure ! and 1 ￿ ! respectively. Each
group of households is endowed with one unit of time, so that an individual borrower and
an individual saver are endowed with a fraction 1=! and 1=1 ￿ ! respectively. There are
also two sectors, producing (non-durable) consumption goods and new housing respec-
tively. In each sector there are competitive producers of a ￿nal good and monopolistic
competitive producers of intermediate goods, with the latter hiring labour from both the
borrowers and the savers. The two types of households feature heterogeneous preferences,
with the borrowers being more impatient than the savers, implying that their marginal
utility of consumption exceeds the marginal utility of saving.17 Both borrowers and savers
derive utility from consumption of the non-durable ￿nal good and from housing services.
Notice that debt accumulation re￿ ects intertemporal equilibrium trading between the two
agents. Borrowers are subject to a collateral constraint, with the borrowing limit tied to
the value of the existing stock of housing.
4.1 Final good producers
In each sector (j = c;h) a perfectly competitive ￿nal good producer purchases Yj;t(i)












where Yj;t(i) is the quantity demanded of the intermediate good i by ￿nal good producer j,
and "j is the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erentiated varieties in sector j. Notice,
in particular, that in the housing sector Yh;t(i) refers to expenditure in the new residential
good i (rather than services). Maximization of pro￿ts yields demand functions for the
typical intermediate good i in sector j:
17For previous examples of saver-borrower models, see Becker (1980), Becker and Foias (1987), Krusell
and Smith (1998), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).19
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Yj;t j = c;h (3)




1￿"j is the price index consistent with the
￿nal good producer in sector j earning zero pro￿ts.18
4.2 Borrowers
A typical borrower consumes an index of consumption services of housing and non-durable















where Ct denotes (non-durable) consumption services, Ht denotes the stock of housing at
the end of period t, ￿ > 0 is the share of housing in the composite consumption index,
and ￿ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing.19









subject to the sequence of budget constraints (in nominal terms):
Pc;t Ct + Ph;tIh;t + R
m
t￿1Bt￿1 = Bt + Wc;tNc;t + Wh;tNh;t + Tt (6)
where Ih;t ￿ Ht ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Ht￿1 is residential investment, Bt is end-of-period t nominal
debt, and Rm
t￿1 is the nominal lending rate on debt contracts stipulated at time t￿1 with
maturity m. Furthermore, Wj;t is the nominal wage earned by the borrower in sector j
(with j = c;h), and Nj;t is total hours supplied in sector j. Finally Tt are net nominal
government transfers.
18Hence the problem of the ￿nal good producer j is: max Pj;tYj;t ￿
R 1
0 Pj;t(i)Yj;t(i)di subject to (2).
19To de￿ne a utility-based aggregate price index one needs to assume the existence of an additional ￿nal
good producer, whose task consists in assembling housing and consumption services via the production
function (4). The price index consistent with maximization of pro￿ts by this producer would read:
Pt ￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿) (Pc;t)1￿￿ + ￿ (Ph;t)1￿￿￿ 1
1￿￿20
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In real terms (units of non-durable consumption), (6) reads











where qt ￿ Ph;t=Pc;t is the relative price of housing, and bt ￿ Bt=Pc;t is real debt. No-
tice that, as a consequence of debt being predetermined in nominal terms, variations in
in￿ ation a⁄ect the real ex-post cost of debt service, and therefore borrower￿ s net worth.
Later we will work with the utility speci￿cation:











where ’ is the inverse of the wage elasticity of labor supply and vj is a scale parameter.20
Variable vs. ￿xed rate Contracts The interest rate Rm
t on a mortgage contract














with ￿ 2 [0;1].
In the case m = 1 the mortgage and the policy rate coincide. Mortgage contracts are
typically multi-period. Multi-period loan contracts can be de￿ned as at variable rate (i.e.,
contracts tied to the short-term policy rate), or at ￿xed rate (tied to a long-term interest
rate) depending on the value of ￿. For ￿ = 0 the mortgage rate is perfectly indexed to
the policy rate, while for ￿ = 1 it is ￿xed to the m-period interest rate. We assume that
the decision on who bears the interest rate risk (either the borrower or the saver) mainly
re￿ ects institutional factors which lie outside the scope of our model.21
20Notice that each household is assumed to derive independent disutility from work in each sector. As
a result, the nominal wage will not be equalized across sectors. This form of labor market segmentation
is useful to dampen the substitution e⁄ect across sectors in response to relative price movements, which
would otherwise tend to generate a counterfactual negative sectoral co-movement in response to aggregate
monetary shocks.
21See Campbell and Cocco (2003) for a normative analysis of the optimal choice between a variable
rate and a ￿xed rate mortgage contract based on household-level risk management.21
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Collateral Constraint Private borrowing is subject to a collateral constraint. At
any time t, the amount that the borrower agrees to repay in the following period, RtBt,
is tied to the expected future value of the housing stock (after depreciation):
RtBt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)Et fHtPh;t+1g (10)
where ￿ is the fraction of the housing value that cannot be used as a collateral. This type
of constraint can be justi￿ed on the basis of limited enforcement.22 Since the borrower can
run away with the assets in case of default, requiring a collateral ex-ante acts against that
temptation. At the margin, the larger the expected realized value of the asset prevailing
at the time of the loan repayment (i.e., t + 1), the larger is the lender￿ s willingness to
extend credit in the current period. The reason is that in the event of default in time t+1
the lender will be able to seize an asset whose value has increased over time. In this vein,
an expected future housing appreciation contributes to expand the ability to borrow in
the current period.
One can think of parameter ￿ as the down-payment rate (or inverse LTV ratio) re-
quired at the beginning of the loan contract (time t), therefore representing a direct
measure of the ￿ exibility of the mortgage market (Jappelli and Pagano 1989). As already
discussed above, the value of ￿ may re￿ ect legal and regulatory constraints changing
across countries (see Table 1). Notice, though, that loan contracts extend for one period
in our environment. Hence parameter ￿ can be broadly interpreted as measuring the abil-
ity of extracting equity from the value of the house during the life span of the mortgage:
in other words, it can be interpreted also as a measure of mortgage equity withdrawal
(MEW), or of the lenders￿willingness to extend home equity lines of credit.23
Given initial values fb￿1, H￿1g, the borrower chooses fNj;t; bt; Ht; Ctg to maximize
(5) subject to (7) and (10). By de￿ning ￿t and ￿t t as the multipliers on constraints (7)
and (10) respectively, and Ux;t as the marginal utility of variable x = C;Nj;H, e¢ ciency
conditions for the above program read:
22Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kocherlakota (2000).
23Technically speaking a measure of MEW should be based on the realized di⁄erence between the
current value of the house and the debt principal still due, rather than be based on the expected realized
market value of the house. The results, however, would not be qualitatively altered in our setting if we
were to adopt the former speci￿cation.22
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j = c;h (11)
Uc;t = ￿t (12)
qtUc;t = Uh;t + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)Et fUc;t+1qt+1g + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)Uc;tqt tEt f￿h;t+1g (13)









Equations (11) govern the consumption/leisure margin in each sector, while (12) equates
the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow value of the ￿ ow budget constraint
(6). Equation (13) is an intertemporal condition driving the choice between housing
and consumption. It requires the borrower to equate the marginal utility of current
consumption (left-hand side) to the marginal gain of housing services (right-hand side).
The latter depends on three components: (i) the direct utility gain of an additional unit
of housing; (ii) the expected utility of expanding future consumption by means of the
realized resale value of a new unit of housing purchased in the previous period; (iii) the
marginal utility stemming from the possibility of using housing in the form of collateral.
Notice that the latter component (which is critical in our analysis) is proportional to the
shadow value of borrowing  t, with that component disappearing when  t = 0, i.e., when
the collateral constraint is not binding.
Equation (14) is a modi￿ed version of an Euler equation. Indeed it reduces to a
standard Euler condition in the case of  t = 0 for all t. This condition is basically
stating that when the collateral constraint is binding ( t > 0), the borrower￿ s marginal
utility of consumption exceeds the marginal utility of saving (i.e., of shifting consumption
intertemporally).
Integrating both (13) and (14) forward, and combining, we can express the margin
between consumption and housing in more compact form as:23
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j Uc;t+jqt+j t+jEt f￿h;t+j+1g
)
The above equation illustrates the channel linking housing collateral and consumption.
The right hand side of (15) has two components, Vt and ￿t. The ￿rst is the present
discounted value of the current and future marginal utility of housing. Recall that the
stock-￿ ow ratio of housing is extremely high, hence the term Vt behaves very smoothly in
response to shocks, and especially if those shocks are temporary in nature as monetary
policy ones. Intuitively, the marginal increment in utility of a new unit of housing is small
relatively to the underlying existing stock. Notice also that under perfect capital markets
Vt would be the only component of the marginal utility of housing. The second term on
the right hand side of (15), ￿t, depends on current and future values of the shadow value
of borrowing  t. Monetary policy has a direct e⁄ect on ￿t by altering the cost of servicing
the debt, and therefore the shadow value of borrowing.
Next consider equation (15): if Vt is quasi constant, and even in the case of purely
￿ exible prices in both sectors (so that the relative price qt is constant in response to
aggregate shocks), any e⁄ect on the shadow value of borrowing will a⁄ect the marginal
utility of consumption. Suppose monetary policy tightens: this will generate a rise in the
current and future values of  t, and therefore a rise in ￿t. In turn, via (15), this will raise
the marginal utility consumption and, in equilibrium, generate a fall in consumption. In
addition, movements in the relative price of housing help to strengthen this channel: for
instance, if the current and future real price of housing falls, the value of collateral shrinks
proportionally, thereby a⁄ecting current borrowing and consumption.24
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4.3 Savers
We assume that the savers are the owners of the monopolistic ￿rms in each sector. A
























Importantly, the discount rate ￿ is such that ￿ > ￿. The saver￿ s sequence of budget
constraints reads (in nominal terms):
Pc;t e Ct+Ph;t( e Ht￿(1￿￿) e Ht￿1)+R
m




where f Wj;t is the nominal wage rate paid to the saver in sector j, and e ￿j;t are nominal
pro￿ts from the holding of monopolistic competitive ￿rms in sector j.






j = c;h (19)



















The interpretation of the above e¢ ciency conditions is standard. In fact, those condi-
tions can be derived as a particular case of (11), (12), and (13) when  t = 0 for all t, and
￿ = ￿.25
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4.4 Production and pricing of intermediate goods
Intermediate-good ￿rm i in sector j hires labor to operate the following production func-
tion:
Yj;t(i) = Lj;t(i) (22)
where Lj;t(i) is total labor employed by ￿rm i in sector j.
Each ￿rm i has monopolistic power in the production of its own variety and therefore
has leverage in setting the price. In so doing it faces a quadratic cost proportional to









where the parameter #j measures the degree of sectoral nominal price rigidity. The higher
#j, the more sluggish the adjustment of nominal prices in sector j. For #j = 0 prices are
￿ exible.
The problem of each monopolistic ￿rm is to choose the sequence fNj;t(i), Pj;t(i)g
1
t=0






















is the saver￿ s stochastic discount factor,
and e ￿t is the saver￿ s marginal utility of nominal income.
Let￿ s denote by Pj;t(i)=Pj;t the relative price of variety i in sector j. In a symmetric
equilibrium in which Pj;t(i)=Pj;t = 1 for all i and j, and all ￿rms employ the same amount
of labor in each sector, the ￿rst order condition of the above problem reads:












where ￿j;t ￿ Pj;t=Pj;t￿1 is the gross in￿ ation rate in sector j, and mcj;t is the real marginal
cost in sector j.26
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Equilibrium in the goods market of sector j = c;h requires that the production of the
￿nal good be allocated to total households￿expenditure and to resource costs originating
from the adjustment of prices:





Yh;t = ! (Ht ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Ht￿1) + (1 ￿ !)
￿











Yj;t(i) di j = c;h
Equilibrium in the debt and labor market requires respectively
!Bt + (1 ￿ !) e Bt = 0 (30)
Lj;t = !Nj;t(i) + (1 ￿ !) e Nj;t(i) j = c;h (31)
4.6 Monetary policy
We assume that monetary policy is conducted by means of an interest rate reaction
function, constrained to be linear in the logs of the relevant arguments:27
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where Rt is the short-term policy rate, and ￿t is a policy shock evolving as:
￿t = ￿r ￿t￿1 + ut
with ut~i:i:d:,with mean zero and variance ￿2
u. Our baseline assumption is to employ a
version of (32) in which ￿j;t = ￿c;t, although the results will not be sensitive to specifying
rules in which the in￿ ation index is the CPI.
5 The channels of monetary policy transmission
Relative to a standard monetary NK framework with perfect ￿nancial markets, mone-
tary policy works via three novel channels in this framework. We label those channels
(i) nominal- debt e⁄ect, (ii) collateral-constraint e⁄ect, and (iii) asset-price e⁄ect, respec-
tively. Although these channels are clearly interrelated in the general equilibrium, it is
helpful, for expositional purposes, to consider them distinctively.
Consider a monetary policy contraction, in the form of an interest rate hike: ￿rst, this
produces a fall in in￿ ation and therefore a rise in the real service cost of debt, which is
predetermined in nominal terms at time t. This e⁄ect is akin to a negative income e⁄ect
via the borrower￿ s budget constraint. We feature this as an independent channel because,
in principle, it would be at work also in the absence of a collateral constraint.
Second, the policy tightening works via the collateral constraint. The rise in the nom-
inal interest rate induces a rise in the shadow value of borrowing both directly (via a
mechanical fall in debt Bt in equation 10) and indirectly, via a heightened future ser-
vice cost of debt. The rise in the shadow value of borrowing, in turn, induces a fall in
consumption via the channel described in equation (15).
Finally, movements in the real price of housing qt also a⁄ect the transmission of mone-
tary policy shocks, by a⁄ecting the (expected) value of the housing stock that can be used
as a collateral. Fluctuations in that value a⁄ect the tightness of the collateral constraint.28
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In our two-sector model, however, this e⁄ect is operative only in the case of asymmetric
price stickiness. With prices ￿ exible or equally sticky in both sectors, in fact, real house
prices would remain unchanged in response to a monetary policy shock. Under our base-
line assumption that house prices are ￿ exible and consumption prices sticky, however, a
policy tightening will induce a fall in the real house price, thereby inducing (all else equal)
a depreciation of the collateral value and a further tightening of the collateral constraint.
In turn, this will induce a fall in the demand for borrowing, and therefore a fall in the
demand for housing, which will further depress its relative price, all in a self-reinforcing
fashion. In this respect, this asset price channel works by strengthening the collateral
channel. In equation (15), in fact, a fall in qt requires an even larger increase in the
marginal utility of consumption in order to match any given variation in the tightness of
the collateral constraint represented by the right-hand side of (15).
This interpretation of the channels at work clari￿es the role of the institutional features
of mortgage markets. First, a lower value of ￿, representing a more ￿ exible/developed
mortgage market, implies that a larger variation in consumption is needed to satisfy (15)
for any given variation in  t (i.e., for any given impact on the tightness of the collateral
constraint). Intuitively, in light of a policy tightening, a more ￿ exible mortgage market
entails that credit to households will be reduced more rapidly, with this e⁄ect translating
proportionally into a variation in consumption. Second, any given variation of the short-
term interest rate will be passed-through to mortgage rates more rapidly if the structure
of mortgage contracts is at variable rate. This pass-through e⁄ect, in turn, will be larger
in those economies with low ￿ mortgage contracts.
6 Dynamic simulations
In this section we evaluate the transmission of monetary policy shocks. We begin by
illustrating how the role of borrowers and of a collateral constraint alter the equilibrium
dynamics relative to a baseline NK model. We then analyze how the transmission of
monetary policy shocks is a⁄ected by two key institutional features: (i) the down-payment
rate ￿; (ii) the interest-rate mortgage structure (￿xed vs. variable debt contract)29
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6.1 Calibration
We resort to the following calibration. Time is in quarters. We set the quarterly discount
rate ￿ = 0:99 > ￿ = 0:98. The annual real interest rate is pinned down by the saver￿ s
patience rate and is equal to 4%. The annual physical depreciation rate for housing is
generally low, and around 1% per year. Therefore we set ￿ = 0:01=4 as a baseline value.
The elasticity of substitution between varieties is set to 7:5 in both sectors, which yields
a steady-state mark-up of 20%.
We assume throughout that house prices are ￿exible. This assumption is not without
controversy. For one, as argued in Barsky et al. (2007), house prices, unlike consumption
prices, are largely subject to negotiation upon transactions, so it could be plausible that
they are relatively more ￿ exible. At the same time, there is evidence that house prices are
subject to a large degree of predictability (see Glaeser and Gyourko 2007), both upward
and downward. Our results, however, do not hinge critically on this assumption.
We set the stickiness parameter for consumer prices equal to a benchmark value of
#c = 75. To pin down this value we proceed as follows. Let ￿ be the probability of
not resetting prices in the standard Calvo-Yun model. We parameterize 1=1 ￿ ￿ = 4,
which implies ￿ = 0:75, and therefore an average frequency of price adjustment of one
year. This value is roughly in line with the micro-based evidence for European countries
summarized in Alvarez et al. (2006) and Angeloni et al. (2006). Log-linearization of
(25) around a zero-in￿ ation steady state (in the consumption sector) yields a slope of
the Phillips curve equal to ("c ￿ 1)=#c, whereas the slope of the Phillips curve in the
Calvo-Yun model reads (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)=￿. Setting the elasticity "c equal to 7:5, which
implies a steady-state markup of 15 percent, the resulting stickiness parameter satis￿es
#c = ￿("c ￿ 1)=(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿) ’ 75.
The current share of housing and housing-related expenditure is about 10% on average
in the euro area. However, by adding owner-occupied housing that number would increase
to 17.5%. Since we do not have rents in the model, we calibrate the share ￿ in order to
match the expenditure for owner-occupied housing. The latter value is estimated as
being 7.5% in the euro area and 24% in the US, although statistical methodologies di⁄er
substantially. We choose to pick an intermediate value of ￿ = 16%. The down-payment
rate is set at ￿ = 0:3 in the baseline calibration, a value which is close to the euro area
average, corresponding to a LTV ratio of about 0:7 (see Table 1). Below, however, we30
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experiment with alternative values of this parameter. As to monetary policy, we set
the Taylor rule parameters ￿￿ = 1:5 and ￿r = 0, and the persistence of the monetary
policy innovation ￿r = 0:7. Throughout we assume that (i) durable prices are ￿exible;
(ii) the elasticity of substitution ￿ equals 1 (which implies Cobb-Douglas preferences in
consumption and housing services); (iii) the monetary policy rule features a reaction to
consumption price in￿ ation.24
6.2 The role of the collateral constraint
We begin by describing the general features of the monetary transmission in our setup.
Figure 5 depicts the e⁄ect on selected per capita variables of a 25 basis point rise in
the nominal (policy) interest rate. Solid lines and dashed lines denote respectively the
borrower￿ s and the saver￿ s choice variables.
In this exercise, we set the share of borrowers to a baseline value of ! = 0:5. Notice,
￿rst, that the monetary policy tightening induces a rise in the shadow value of borrowing
 t. This in turn induces a contractionary e⁄ect on borrower￿ s consumption (collateral-
constraint e⁄ect). Since house prices are ￿ exible (and consumption prices sticky), the
policy tightening induces also a fall in the real house price qt, which in turn reduces directly
the collateral value, further contributing to a tightening of the borrowing conditions (asset-
price e⁄ect). As a result, real household debt falls, the demand for housing services drops
on impact and then starts to gradually revert back towards the steady state.
To better understand why, despite prices being ￿ exible in that sector, the demand for
housing services and therefore residential investment both fall, it is useful to notice that
a policy tightening increases the user cost of housing. The user cost is the key intertem-
poral price that drives the relative demand of housing vs. consumption. Condition (13)
requires the marginal rate of substitution between housing and consumption, Uh;t=Uc;t, to
be equated to the user cost (Zt), which in this case reads:







The user cost depends positively on the current relative price of housing but inversely
on the future price. Intuitively, expected capital gains on the holding of housing decrease
24All our results do not hinge on these assumptions in any signi￿cant way.31
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the current user cost. A typical feature of the model with a collateral constraint is that
the user cost depends not only on the dynamic of qt but also on the shadow value of
borrowing  t. In particular, one can show that a rise in the shadow value of borrowing
generally induces a rise in the user cost.25 The ￿gure makes clear that, under a collateral
constraint, ￿ uctuations in the shadow value of borrowing overwhelmingly drive the user
cost. As a result, a policy tightening induces a rise in the user cost, a fall in the relative
demand for housing services, and a fall in residential investment.
The ￿gure shows also the response of consumption by a typical saver (dashed lines).
Recall that the savers are standard permanent-income agents. Two competing e⁄ects
drive their demand. For one, a positive income shock, which is the counterpart of the
negative income shock for the borrowers. This e⁄ect leads the savers to increase both
consumption and housing services. However, the rise in the real interest rate makes them
substitute consumption intertemporally, so that, on balance, savers￿consumption is less
responsive than borrowers￿consumption. At the same time, since the relative price of
housing falls, the savers increase their demand for housing services. For these agents, in
fact, the relevant user cost of housing is the one prevailing in the absence of any collateral
constraint, and therefore it depends heavily on the behavior of the (intratemporal) relative
price of housing qt (and not on  t).
6.2.1 Varying the down-payment rate and the interest rate structure
Figure 6 depicts the e⁄ect on aggregate consumption and residential investment of vary-
ing the down-payment rate ￿. We continue to assume a variable interest rate mortgage
structure. We consider three cases for parameter ￿: 0:05, 0:1, 0:3. This range of values
approximately spans the gap between LTV ratios that have been common in the US in
the last few years (arguably before the onset of the ￿nancial crisis) and average European
ones.
Two results stand out. First, as in the data, the response of residential investment
is signi￿cantly larger than the one of consumption. Intuitively, each household tries,
in response to the policy shock, to smooth the response of both consumption and the
housing stock (although this smoothing ability is limited by the presence of the borrowing
constraint). Given that the stock-￿ ow ratio of housing is particularly high, the elasticity
25See Monacelli (2008) for an analysis on this point referred to durable goods consumption.32
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of residential investment (i.e., of the housing expenditure ￿ ow) to interest rate changes
is particularly high. Second, the response of both variables is ampli￿ed by a smaller
down-payment rate. As suggested above, a lower down-payment rate increases, all else
equal, the sensitivity of borrowing to changes in the value of the collateral. A more
rapid contraction of borrowing leads to a more rapid contraction of both consumption
and housing services, and in turn of residential investment.
Figure 7 displays the e⁄ect of varying the interest-rate mortgage structure (which,
in practice, corresponds to the degree of interest rate pass-through). We analyze two
cases. The ￿rst case considers a debt structure in which the mortgage rate is freely linked
to the short-term policy rate (variable rate, Rm
t = Rt for all t, or alternatively ￿ = 0
in equation (9)). The second case is a limit case of a ￿xed rate mortgage structure.
This is approximated by considering the variant of the term structure equation (9) for
￿ ! 1, with maturity m extending to a limit case of an in￿nite number of periods. In
each case, we compare the e⁄ect of varying the interest rate structure under alternative
values of parameter ￿. We wish to highlight, in fact, that also the interaction of di⁄erent
institutional characteristics of the mortgage market is potentially relevant.
When the down-payment rate ￿ is low (￿ = 0:05, upper panel), a variable rate contract
structure signi￿cantly ampli￿es the responses of both consumption and residential invest-
ment relative to the ￿xed rate case. When the down-payment is high, though, (￿ = 0:3,
upper panel) the e⁄ect of moving from a ￿xed to a variable rate structure is signi￿cantly
dampened. Intuitively, even if the pass-through from policy rates to mortgage rates is
high (as under variable rate contracts) when the ability to borrow remains limited because
of low LTV ratios, the interest rate structure of the mortgage matters relatively less.26
Notice, however, that in all cases a ￿xed rate structure does not necessarily imply that
consumption is unresponsive on impact. In this case, a policy tightening is still generating
both a nominal-debt and a collateral-constraint e⁄ect (via a fall in the relative price of
housing, which in turn depresses borrowing capability). With real house prices returning
back to baseline, then, the e⁄ect on consumption is quickly reversed in the case of a ￿xed
rate mortgage structure, whereas it continues to persist under a variable rate structure.
26This result may vary, though, in a context in which multi-period contracts are speci￿ed. Namely,
if the ability to extract borrowing is in￿ uenced by the LTV ratio only at the beginning of the contract,
during the maturity of the loan the interest rate structure may continue to a⁄ect disposable income
signi￿cantly. In our context this is not feasible, for debt contracts are renewed in every period.33
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7 Conclusions
We have studied the role of housing ￿nance for the transmission of monetary policy on
consumption, residential investment and house prices in a sample of industrialized coun-
tries. We have provided evidence that, according to a wide set of indicators, such structure
varies signi￿cantly across industrialized countries. We have then shown that residential
investment and house prices are usually more responsive to policy shocks in those coun-
tries with more developed/￿ exible mortgage markets. As for consumption, it is really two
indicators that matter: the possibility (or lack thereof) of mortgage equity release and
the prevailing interest rate structure of mortgage contracts. We have then built a DSGE
model of the monetary transmission with three non-standard features: (i) two sectors; (ii)
heterogeneity in patience rates; (iii) a collateral constraint on borrowing. We have shown
that the response of consumption and residential investment to monetary policy shocks
is a⁄ected by alternative values of two institutional parameters of mortgage markets: the
down-payment rate, and the interest-rate mortgage structure (variable vs. ￿xed interest
rate). In particular, the model can rationalize the evidence that private consumption is
more responsive to monetary impulses in economies with more developed/￿ exible mort-
gage markets, somewhat in contrast with the presumption that more developed mortgage
(credit) markets should be conducive to more e¢ cient consumption-smoothing.
There are several issues that have remained unexplored in this work and that it would
be interesting to pursue in future research. First, providing a full estimation of the model.
Recent work by Iacoviello and Neri (2008) is an interesting step in this direction. Sec-
ond, introducing an endogenous choice by the households between variable and ￿xed rate
mortgage contracts. Third, studying how the optimal conduct of monetary policy varies
according to the characteristics of mortgage markets, and in particular in the context of
a currency area (such as the euro area) in which the heterogeneity of mortgage market
institutions remains widespread.34
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TABLE 1. Institutional characteristics of national mortgage systems. 
Country Mortgage 
debt to GDP 
ratio (2004) 
Typical loan 






























Not used  0.34 
Canada  43%  75%  F and M(92%) 
V(8%) 
25 Used  0.57 
Denmark 85% 80%  F  (75%) 
M (10%) 
V (15%) 
30 Used  0.82 
Finland 27%  75%  F(2%) 
V(97%) 
Other(1%) 
17 Used  0.49 
France 26%  75%  F/M/Other(86%)
V(14%) 
15 Not  used  0.23 
Germany 43% 70%  Mainly  F  and 
M 
25 Not  used  0.28 
Ireland 50%  70%  V(70%) 
Rest mostly M 
20 Limited  use  0.39 
Italy 13%  50%  F(28%) 
Rest mainly M 
15 Not  used  0.26 
Japan 36%  70-80%  F(36%) 
M and V(64%) 
25 Not  used  0.39 
Netherlands 68%  90%  F(74%) 
M(19%) 
V(7%) 
30 Used  0.71 
New Zealand  80%  60%  Mainly F  25  Used  NA 
Norway 54%  70%  Mainly  V  17  Used  0.59 
Spain 40%  70%  V(≥75%) 
Rest mainly M 
20 Limited  use  0.40 
Sweden 35%  80%  F(38%) 
M(24%) 
V(38%) 
25 Used  0.66 
Switzerland  116%  66%  Mainly  V NA Not  used NA 
United 
Kingdom 
74% 80-90%  M(28%) 
V(72%) 
25 Used  0.58 
United States  69%  80%  F(85%) 
M(15%) 
30 Used  0.98 
       
Notes: a) Breakdown of new loans by type. Fixed (F): Interest rate fixed for more than five years or until 
expiry; Mixed (M): Interest rate fixed between one and five years; Variable (V): Interest rate renegotiable 
after one year or tied to market rates or adjustable at the discretion of the lender. b) The IMF index is a 
composite indicator (between 0 and 1) of the degree of development and completeness of a national 
mortgage market; a higher value indicates a higher degree of market development and completeness. 
Sources: The main data sources are Council of Mortgage Lenders (http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/home),   
ECB (2003), IMF (2008), OECD,  and Miles and Pillonca (2008). Additional information is drawn 
fromAhearne et al. (2005), Catte et al. (2004), Debelle (2004), Girouard and Blöndal (2001), Muellbauer 
and Murphy (2008), Seko (1994) and Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004).  39
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Note: See text for further explanations. The same VAR model is estimated country-by-country over the 
sample period 1980:Q1 to 2007:Q4. The figures report the cross-sectional average impulse response 
over 19 countries to a standardised monetary policy shock and 2 standard error bands computed by 
making 1,000 bootstraps with joint re-sampling.  42
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FIGURE 2. Sub-group mean impulse responses of private consumption to a 
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Note: See text for further explanations. The same VAR model is estimated country-by-country over the 
sample period 1980:Q1 to 2007:Q4 (or closest depending on data availability in each country). The full 
group of 19 countries is split approximately in half where each country is classified as having a “high 
developed” or “low developed” mortgage market according to the ranking in the four considered 
indicators. In particular, countries with (i) relatively higher (lower) loan-to-value ratio, (ii) where 
mortgage equity withdrawal is (is not) allowed, (iii) with relatively higher (lower) mortgage to GDP 
ratio and (iv) where the interest rate adjustment is predominantly variable rate (fixed rate) are classified 
as high (low) mortgage market developed countries. The thick blue line refers to high development 
countries, the thin purple line to low development countries. Two standard error bands are computed by 
a bootstrapping procedure (based on 1,000 bootstraps), with joint re-sampling.  43
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FIGURE 3. Sub-group mean impulse responses of residential investment to a 
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Note: See text for further explanations. The same VAR model is estimated country-by-country over the 
sample period 1980:Q1 to 2007:Q4 (or closest depending on data availability in each country). The full 
group of 19 countries is split approximately in half where each country is classified as having a “high 
developed” or “low developed” mortgage market according to the ranking in the four considered 
indicators. In particular, countries with (i) relatively higher (lower) loan to value ratio, (ii) where 
mortgage equity withdrawal is (is not) allowed, (iii) with relatively higher (lower) mortgage to GDP 
ratio and (iv) where the interest rate adjustment is predominantly variable rate (fixed rate) are classified 
as high (low) mortgage market developed countries. The thick blue line refers to high development 
countries, the thin purple line to low development countries. Two standard error bands are computed by 
a bootstrapping procedure (based on 1,000 bootstraps), with joint re-sampling. 44
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FIGURE 4. Sub-group mean impulse responses of the real house price to a 
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Note: See text for further explanations. The same VAR model is estimated country-by-country over the 
sample period 1980:Q1 to 2007:Q4 (or closest depending on data availability in each country). The full 
group of 19 countries is split approximately in half where each country is classified as having a “high 
developed” or “low developed” mortgage market according to the ranking in the four considered 
indicators. In particular, countries with (i) relatively higher (lower) loan to value ratio, (ii) where 
mortgage equity withdrawal is (is not) allowed, (iii) with relatively higher (lower) mortgage to GDP 
ratio and (iv) where the interest rate adjustment is predominantly variable rate (fixed rate) are classified 
as high (low) mortgage market developed countries. The thick blue line refers to high development 
countries, the thin purple line to low development countries. Two standard error bands are computed by 
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FIGURE 5.  Theoretical Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Tightening (% 
deviations from steady state). 
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FIGURE 6.  Theoretical Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Tightening: 
Effect of Varying the Down-Payment Rate. (% deviations from steady state) 
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FIGURE 7.  Theoretical Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Tightening: 
Effect of Varying the Interest Rate Contract Structure (solid line variable rate, 
dashed line fixed rate). (% deviations from steady state) 
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